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The Intellectual Standard

On Reason
Michael Christison, Editor
It challenges us to face the truth. It tells us when we are wrong. It
can sometimes bewilder us with its brutal simplicity. Some call it logic or
rational thinking. Others refer to it as "pure reason:' Whatever you want
to call it, we have no choice but to utilize this cognitive ability if we want
to achieve our goals. Few, however, tend to figure out what it is that they
are doing. If you cannot explain reason, it becomes that much harder to
justify any given action. If an action is not taken according to reason, a
justification will become harder still. The biggest issue at hand is that many
people become so accustomed to a life of emotional whim, that it leads to
a neglecting of their more useful mental faculties. Believe what you will
about the best kind of life, but there is no denying that when such people
need help in supporting some claim, their friendly neighborhood reason is
nowhere to be found.
There are cases in which we might think we are making good use
of reason when we are not, and a deeper understanding would help us
notice.1 For instance, it is illogical to make a presumptuous generalization
about an individual's habits based on a limited set of attributes. Say Jim
Bob often wears cowboy hats, and I draw the conclusion that he also lis
tens to country music. There might be some legitimate correlation between
cowboy hat-donning people and people who listen to country music, but
this does not mean the connection I have made is logical. What I am doing
in actuality is taking a single case and comparing it to a general pattern I
have experienced. If I were to treat my conclusion as fact, there would be
no basis for it. What I have observed is other cowboy hat-wearing people
listening to country music, not Jim-Bob. Therefore, I am making a pre
diction about something I do not know first-hand from experience, and I
should treat it as just that: a prediction.
It is first important to make clear this predictive mode of thought
I will not address the issue from a neuro-biological standpoint, but from a
standpoint grounded in, ironically, the content itself: experience-based reason.
The goal of this project is to present reason in a simplified and digestible form,
away from complex abstractions like the popular uses of "deduction" and "in
duction;' and the current epistemological debates.

Vol. 1- Iss. 1 - January 2012

9

The Intellectual Standard

ON REASON

so as to distinguish it from what reason consists of in essence. Humans
are pattern-seeking creatures. We see that certain situations are similar to
other situations that we have encountered in the past. Then we compare
them as I have between Jim-Bob and the previous cowboy hat wearers. We
could, perhaps, go further and claim that certain generalizations follow all
my initial perceptions of stimuli in the world. Yet, these observations do
not capture the essence of reason, for we still have no criterion that is spe
cific enough to help us decide which generalizations are correct and which
are not. Although noticing similarity and judging how the future will be
is necessary for our survival, living only with this limited understanding
makes us more prone to incorrect judgment. Examining the conscious
process should help to enlighten us.
When we reason consciously about reality,2 it is a result of our de
sire to explain the way reality is rather than the way it could be. Our goal
is to answer a why question, typically concerning two alternative events. I
might trip over something, thus spurring a desire to discover the cause. I
would have to answer the question: "Why did I trip rather than continue to
walk?" Perhaps there was a crack jutting up from the sidewalk, or there was
an object in my path that I failed to notice. I might even consider some sort
of divine intervention.3 These would be considered causal explanations,
but similar uses of reason would also extend to non-causal explanations.
For example, Xanthippe's becoming a widow when Socrates died is
non-causal. The formal definition of cause requires that there be temporal
distance between two events, and there is usually a noticeable physical in
teraction between the objects in the events. Yet, there is no window of time
between Socrates' death and Xanthippe's becoming a widow. Furthermore,
there is clearly no physical interaction relating the events. The relation in
stead appears to be a logical one.
If I wanted an explanation for Xanthippe's becoming Socrates'
widow, there is a specific list of statements that is both sufficient and neces
sary:

1) Xanthippe was married to Socrates; 2)

Socrates died; and 3) When

a person's husband dies at time( t), that person is a widow at t. This might
not always be the answer someone gives in its entirety, but whichever is not
said of these three statements would have to be logically implied.
2
3

Thinking actively, paying attention to the thoughts themselves.
Peter Lipton in Inference to the Best Explanation argues that this type of expla
nation would show a causal relation.
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This type of logical connection is the basis of reason and encom
passes both causal and non-causal relations. It is called dependence, and it
takes the logical form: If not A, then not B. Xanthippe's becoming a widow
is dependent upon the death of Socrates, and if Socrates had not died at t,
Xanthippe would not have become a widow at t. Moreover, if we take away
any of steps

( 1)-(3),

Xanthippe would not have become Socrates' widow.

The event is dependent upon every step.
We recognize relations of dependence not only between particu
lars as in the previous two examples, but also between types when we gen
erate definitions.4 Take the statement, "All water consists of two hydrogen
molecules and one oxygen molecule:' If not for this combination of mol
ecules, a particular substance could not be identified as water. Similarly,
we notice a chair is for sitting. If the object is not meant for sitting, then it
is not a chair. Dependence relations are integral to the identification of es
sential characteristics.
In this sense, particular and type relations go hand in hand. We
observe that there is a definition involving dependence relations that tell
us what a chair is. Then when we encounter some particular object in the
world that satisfies the conditions put forth in the type-definition, we can
take action based upon that. If I want to sit down somewhere, however, it
is not necessary that I stop and think about the definition of something be
fore I sit down. What is required is that I recognize which objects I can sit
on and which I cannot. Regardless of what I would be thinking consciously
before choosing where to sit, there would be relations of dependence my
brain would have to recognize before I could act. If I were to give some
criterion, then, by which we could distinguish reason from other thought
processes in the way I have defined it, it would be this: At the very least, if
the content ofyour conscious thought process involves an accurate relation
ofdependence, you are making use ofreason. 5
Certain areas of my explanation may seem obvious to some or
complex to others, but my main point is this: we often take reason for
granted in action. The logical thought processes by which we live our lives
happen so quickly, that at certain points we do not slow down and reason
4

"Particulars" denote individual/unique things and "types" denote a kind/cat
egory of thing.

S

There are many responses that can be made and more ramifications to explain,
but that is for another essay.
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consciously when we ought to. When we do slow down, sometimes we
realize that we had not been applying logic correctly in action. In regard to
Jim-Bob, I did not ask myself if this statement is true or false: "If Jim-Bob
does not wear a cowboy hat, he would not listen to country music:' If I had,
I would realize that there is no connection of dependence here.
Most people live more by predictive generalization rather than
conscious reasoning. The consequences are not always so dire, but this
habit tempers our minds to continue predicting when the situation war
rants a reasoned response. If we decide to live, none of us can ever escape
from actual relations of dependence, and even when acting without con
scious thought, we all make judgments about how things are dependent
upon one another. We have to judge, for instance, that it has been good
to eat and drink and sleep in the past if we want to take reasonable life
sustaining actions for the future. If we cannot escape from these actual
relations, we may as well embrace them and work to excel at using the one
mental faculty that can calculate them. Understanding how we use reason
on a more conscious level can help us in situations when we do not think
very consciously. It would be difficult to slow down to think more deeply
for every action in our lives, but if we do this more often, we should theo
retically get quicker at it and better at it.
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